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We investigate the impact of two types of financial liberalizations on short- and long-horizon capital
flows to emerging markets in a framework that controls for push and pull factors. The first type of
liberalization, a reduction in capital controls, is countrywide but uncertain, because its extent and permanence
is not known with certainty.  The second type, a cross-border listing, is a firm-level liberalization that
has no uncertainty.  Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that the deterministic cross-listing
results in an immediate but short-lived increase in capital inflows.  In contrast, the uncertain reduction
in capital controls results in increased inflows only over a longer horizon, if at all.
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Most of the nearly 200 countries in the world have some form of barriers to inward 
international investment, and some of these barriers are severe.  Event study findings of Bekaert 
et al. (2002) and Edison and Warnock (2003) indicate that capital inflows increase after an initial 
liberalization, but liberalizations are almost never complete, one-time events (Bacchetta and van 
Wincoop, 2000; Bekaert and Harvey, 1995).  In this paper we ask the question, What is the effect 
of a marginal liberalization on short- and long-horizon capital inflows?  To answer this we focus 
on equity flows from the United States to nine major emerging markets while controlling for 
various ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors previously determined to affect capital flows. 
We examine two types of financial liberalizations.  The first is a change in a country’s 
international investment restrictions.  To quantify this type of liberalization, we use the first 
difference of the Edison and Warnock (2003) monthly measure of the intensity of capital 
controls.  The measure captures not only the date of the initial opening of a market, but also the 
extent of that opening and the evolution and intensity of subsequent changes in controls.  Such 
liberalizations are countrywide but entail some uncertainty, in particular because the permanence 
of the liberalization may not be known.   
The second type of liberalization that we study, the cross-border listing of an individual 
emerging market equity on a global equity market, is less broad but more certain.  We think of a 
cross-listing as a firm-level liberalization that owes, perhaps, to an improvement in the quality of 
financial information.  Emerging equity markets not only have higher transaction costs and a 
greater likelihood of failed trades, but also potentially poor financial information that reflects 
varied accounting practices, disclosure requirements, and enforcement.  All of these costs—
direct and informational—are alleviated when a foreign firm lists on a U.S. exchange.  For  
  2 
example, the cross-listed firm opts into the information environment inherent in U.S. investor 
protection regulations, which include reconciliation to U.S. GAAP and adherence to the SEC’s 
disclosure requirements and securities laws.  Existing empirical evidence is consistent with this 
view of a cross-listing as a firm-level liberalization.  Compared to firms that are only available 
on home exchanges, cross-listed firms have higher valuations (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 
2004), more accurate analyst forecasts (Lang et al. 2003a), less evidence of insider trading 
(Tribukait, 2003), more informative financial reporting (Lang et al. 2003a; Lang et al. 2003b; 
Leuz et al. 2003; Barth et al. 2006), and greater U.S. participation (Edison and Warnock, 2004).  
Moreover, we think of a cross-listing as a deterministic liberalization, the extent and permanence 
of which is known with certainty; the costs the firm incurs to initially cross-list are likely 
sufficiently large to inhibit a reversal in the liberalization (a delisting).  In our sample, there were 
no voluntary delistings.
1 
The theoretical work of Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000) provides guidance as to the 
likely effect of country-wide liberalizations of uncertain permanence (i.e., reductions in capital 
controls) and permanent firm-specific liberalizations (cross-listings).  In their model—a 
simplified version of which is presented in Section 2—permanent liberalizations that are known 
with certainty result in a sharp, temporary increase in inflows as investors immediately rebalance 
their portfolios to incorporate the newly available securities.  Long-run inflows increase too, but 
not to the extent of the temporary increase.  In contrast, if the liberalization is uncertain, the 
                                                       
1 Delistings in our sample occurred because the company fell below minimum NYSE requirements for 
trading and size (5); went bankrupt (1); or merged or restructured (2). The reader might believe, due to the 
furor over Sarbanes Oxley, that many foreign firms want to delist. However, there is no evidence that this 
is true for the exchange-listed firms that we focus on. These firms have a very substantial portion of their 
shareholder bases in the United States, with median U.S. holdings of cross-listed firms at 24% of market 
capitalization (Edison and Warnock, 2004).  For a careful study of deregistrations (which are distinct 
from delistings), see Leuz et al. (2006).  
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initial increase is attenuated; long-run flows still increase, more so as the uncertainty is resolved, 
but the sharp initial inflow is absent. 
We gauge the impact of the two types of liberalizations in an empirical framework that 
controls for global push factors and country-specific pull factors.  In line with previous research 
we find important roles for push factors such as U.S. economic activity and U.S. interest rates.
2 
We also find limited evidence that investors chased past returns.
3  Controlling for these factors, 
our results on financial liberalizations are largely in line with the predictions of the Bacchetta 
and van Wincoop (2000) model.  Deterministic firm-level liberalizations (cross-listings) result in 
an  immediate  surge  in  capital  inflows,  but  with  little  if  any  follow  through.  Country-level 
liberalizations,  which  are  more  uncertain,  do  not  lead  to  immediate  inflows,  but  rather  to 
increased inflows over a longer horizon; in our sample, this is particularly evident in Asia.  
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section presents the underlying theoretical 
model.  Section 3 describes the data used in our empirical analysis: capital flows data, our capital 
controls  and  cross-border  listings  variables,  and  standard  push  and  pull  factors.    Section  4 
presents our panel regression results.  Section 5 contains concluding remarks.  
 
2. Barriers to International Investment and Capital Flows  
                                                       
2 Chuhan et al. (1998) found that push factors￿the decrease in U.S. interest rates and the slowdown in 
U.S. industrial production￿help explain flows to both Latin American and emerging Asian countries 
from 1988 to 1992, and that pull factors such as equity returns or credit ratings matter for flows to Asia 
but not necessarily for Latin American flows. Calvo et al. (1993) also find evidence of an important role 
for global push factors.  See Griffin et al. (2004) for recent evidence on push (and pull) factors. 
3 The evidence on returns-chasing behavior is mixed.  Using monthly data, Bohn and Tesar (1996) find 
that investors chase past returns in some markets.  The literature that focuses on information asymmetries 
using high frequency flows provides conflicting evidence; see, for example, Dvorak (2005), Choe et al. 
(2005), and Seasholes (2000).  Utilizing the more advanced techniques of Grinblatt et al. (1995), Thomas 
et al. (2006) find no evidence of returns chasing.  
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The theoretical model underlying our empirical work is one of international barriers to 
investment.    Black  (1974)  and  Stulz  (1981)  model  barriers  as  taxes  that  reduce  returns.  
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000) also model barriers in this manner but in a dynamic setting 
that  enables  them  to  trace  out  the  impact  on  capital  flows  of  deterministic  and  uncertain 
liberalizations.  In this subsection, we present a simplified version of the Bacchetta and van 
Wincoop (2000) model.
4 
Specifically, assume that U.S. investors choose how to allocate their wealth, W, between 
U.S. equities and the equities of J emerging markets.  Period t returns on U.S. equities are given 
by  )    , N(   r
2
US US t    , US s m ~ .  Let  )    , (   N    
2
EM EM jt s m m ~  be returns on equities in emerging market j.  
For U.S. investors, these emerging market returns are subject to a foreign investor tax, ￿jt, so that 
net returns in emerging market j are 
 
t m jt jt jt   -     =   r  ,  (1) 
 
with expected return  t m jt EM jt   -     =   r .  For simplicity, assume that returns are uncorrelated across 




US   =   .  Investors have exponential utility function  e   =   (C)   U
C     -q , with 
consumption equal to the portfolio return, Rt, times W.  Thus, U.S. investors choose portfolio 
allocations to maximize period t utility that is a function of the mean-variance tradeoff: 
 
                                                       
4 There are other models of capital flows. For example, in the models of Brennan and Cao (1997), 
Brennan et al. (2005), and Griffin et al. (2004), information asymmetries between foreign and domestic 
investor influence the relationship between flows and returns.  
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The first term of (4) proscribes equal weights on each country in the world (J emerging markets 
and the US).  Risk is assumed to be constant across countries, so deviations from equal weights 
arise through differential expected returns.  In particular, the second term puts greater weights on 
emerging markets with expected returns that exceed the world average.  If country j liberalizes 
(modeled as a reduction in ￿j), inflows occur: 
  






    1)   +   (J
J   -
  =  
¶
¶
.  (5) 
 
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000) solve the dynamics of capital flows for a more 
general version in which the liberalization-induced inflows are subject to installation costs, 
which produces nonlinearities in the dynamics of inflows.  In addition, they allow for learning by 
market participants; liberalizations may be deterministic and known by all or uncertain.  As (5) 
indicates, deterministic liberalizations result in a surge in inflows that then tapers off.  In 
contrast, liberalizations that require learning by market participants lead to increased inflows that 
are smaller initially (compared to a deterministic liberalization) but increase as the uncertainty is 
resolved. 
For our purposes, the dismantling of capital controls at the country level and the firm-
level international cross-listing of an equity are both international financial liberalizations, albeit 
of different natures.  Country-level capital controls can be reduced, but such changes are not 
certain, even after they have been announced.  For example, countries have been known to 
reimpose capital controls—recent examples are Argentina in 2001 and Malaysia in 1998—so the 
true extent of any liberalization can only be learned over time and even then not with certainty.
5  
An individual firm’s cross-listing, especially on an exchange that requires more stringent 
financial disclosure than the home exchange, can also be considered a liberalization.  In this case 
the liberalization is not countrywide, but also does not come with the uncertainty of changes in 
capital controls.  All of the necessary information for the cross-listing must be in order before the 
                                                       
5 There are times when capital controls shut down trading in ADRs; see, for example, the Argentine case 
in Auguste et al. (2006).  In our opinion, these are best thought of as changes in capital controls, not an 
undoing of an ADR program.  
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event, so in effect the “liberalization” is known with certainty at the time of the listing.
6  Based 
on the model, we would expect inflows to increase over time with a countrywide liberalization 
but immediately with a cross-listing.  Before turning to an empirical test of the model, in the next 
section we present the various data in more detail. 
 
3. The Data 
 
In this section we discuss details of the data on bilateral capital flows, financial 
liberalization at both the country- and firm-level, and push and pull factors. 
 
3.1 Bilateral Equity Flows: A Short Primer 
 
The capital flows data we analyze are monthly portfolio equity flows from the United 
States to emerging market countries, compiled by the U.S. Treasury International Capital (TIC) 
Reporting System.  U.S. net purchases of securities in a given country are defined as gross 
purchases of foreign securities by U.S. residents from residents of that country minus gross sales 
of foreign securities from U.S. residents to residents of that country.
7 
                                                       
6 One sometimes hears that trading in ADRs dries up.  This must refer to Level I (OTC) ADRs, which are 
not included in our cross-listing variable; we know of no evidence that exchange-listed ADRs have dried 
up.  From the Edison and Warnock (2004) data set on holdings, only 3 of 55 exchange-listed ADRs from 
the nine countries in our sample have U.S. holdings of less than 7% of market capitalization.  Given home 
bias, even 7% is a large amount.  Median U.S. holdings for these exchange listed ADRs is a sizeable 24% 
of market capitalization.  Level 1 OTC ADRs do dry up; almost half the 71 Level I ADRs in the Edison 
and Warnock (2004) holdings data set have U.S. holdings of less than 7%, with some near zero.  We do 
not consider Level I ADRs “cross-listed”. 
7 Griever et al. (2001) is a primer on the TIC data, which have been used in Tesar and Werner (1994), 
Brennan and Cao (1997), Taylor and Sarno (1997), Chuhan et al. (1998), and Bekaert et al. (2002).  The 
TIC flows are also the basis of the U.S. portion of the Portes and Rey (2005) data set. Other sources on  
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To set the scene, Table 1 presents portfolio equity flows to Latin America and Asia in the 
broader group of all private capital flows from all (including non-U.S.) investors.  Portfolio 
equity flows are usually smaller than direct investment or bond flows, and their share can be 
quite volatile.  In both Latin America and emerging Asia, the share of equity inflows increased in 
the early 1990s and peaked in 1993.  By 1998, global equity flows had all but dried up in Latin 
America, but were somewhat more resilient in Asia; in 1999 equities represented 34 percent of 
net inflows into Asia. 
We focus on the 1990s, a period during which many countries liberalized their financial 
markets and many emerging-market firms cross-listed.  Figure 1, which depicts U.S. flows to 
Latin America and Emerging Asia as a percentage of regional market capitalization, gives a 
sense of the nature of U.S. monthly capital flow data during this period and illustrates three facts.  
First, U.S. investors moved into Latin American equity markets in the early 1990s, but did not 
begin to invest large amounts in Asian emerging markets until a few years later.  Second, the 
effects of two crises are evident.  The Mexican crisis of 1994 coincided with a prolonged period 
of relatively small inflows to Latin America, but only a brief pause in flows to Asia.  In contrast, 
the effects of the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998 appear to be greater in Latin American 
countries, in which U.S. investors sold equities on net, than in Asia, where equity purchases by 
U.S. investors only slowed.  Finally, the figures highlight a feature of the flow data that any 
                                                                                                                                                                           
capital flows data exist.  The sudden stops literature typically uses annual or quarterly global (not 
bilateral) flows from the IMF’S International Financial Statistics database (e.g., Frankel and Cavallo, 
2004).  High frequency capital flows data are available from proprietary sources, although it is difficult to 
gauge the scope of their coverage.  Froot et al. (2001) use proprietary data that include only transactions 
by State Street clients for which the countries of the currency and the foreign equity are the same.  This 
excludes trading in ADRs, which are likely a large and variable portion of cross-border trading 
(Pulatkonak and Sofianos, 1999; Ahearne et al. 2004).  Our data include transactions in ADRs.  High 
frequency flows over short periods have also been analyzed by Richards (2005) and Griffin et al. (2004).  
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modeling approach must address, the lumpiness in equity purchases that appears as large spikes 
in the data. 
There are three aspects of the monthly TIC data that can confound the analysis of capital 
flows: coverage is limited to flows that involve U.S. residents, trades through third countries 
result in a geographical bias in bilateral flows data, and equity financing of cross-border mergers 
makes it increasingly difficult to analyze equity flows.  In the remainder of this subsection, we 
briefly consider the effects of these three issues on our sample. 
  Coverage Limited to U.S. Investors.  The TIC data are bilateral portfolio flows into and 
out of the United States and, hence, do not include other countries’ investments in emerging 
markets.  The ideal data for a study of capital flows is a world matrix of flows at the highest 
frequency possible, with the i,j element giving the net flow from country i into country j’s 
securities.  Such a data set does not exist, as very few countries collect bilateral capital flows 
data.  As Table 2 implies, equity flows from other countries are also important, with the share of 
U.S. to global flows to these regions ranging from 15 to 50 percent.  However, because so few 
countries collect bilateral capital flows data, the coverage of the TIC data is quite good.  
Trades through Third Countries.  A strong but common assumption—that the countries 
of the foreign intermediary and foreign issuer are identical—must be made when using 
transactions-based capital flows data.  It is by now well understood that capital flows data 
collected for balance of payments purposes are based on the country of the foreign intermediary, 
which is not necessarily the country in which the issuer of the foreign security resides.  The 
assumption that the countries of the intermediary and issuer are the same is clearly is not true for 
trades through financial centers, which skew the geography of capital flows.  Warnock and 
Cleaver (2003) showed that this geographical bias is severe for financial centers such as the  
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United Kingdom, but not for emerging market regions.  To determine whether the TIC data for 
the countries in our sample are accurate, we followed Warnock and Cleaver (2003) and used the 
flows data to estimate positions which we then compared to the positions reported in the 1997 
Benchmark Survey of U.S. Holdings of Foreign Securities.
8  While there are many variables that 
go into the calculation of the estimates—for example, valuation adjustments—egregious 
discrepancies between the estimate and the survey amount would suggest problems with the 
country attribution of the capital flows data.  Results of this comparison (not shown) indicate 
that, with the possible exception of Brazil, the TIC flows data appear to be rather accurate for 
these countries.  
Merger-Related Stock Swaps.  Cross-border mergers and acquisitions have been 
increasingly financed by “stock swaps” whereby shareholders of the target company receive 
shares in the new (or existing) foreign company.  For example, when Daimler acquired Chrysler, 
shares of Chrysler were “swapped” for Daimler Chrysler shares.  Such acquisitions are not 
included in the TIC data, but any “flowback” is.
9  This has a greater impact on studies of 
industrial country capital flows, such as flows opposite Germany or the United Kingdom, 
because of the large Daimler Chrysler and BP Amoco mergers.  The bottom line of Table 2 
shows, however, that stock swaps do not affect our emerging markets sample. 
                                                       
8 The survey is available at www.treas.gov/fpis.html. 
9 Consider three strategies that were available to Chrysler shareholders who were content with the share of 
foreign equities in their portfolios prior to the swap. They could have sold Chrysler after the merger was 
announced but before it occurred, which would have no confounding effect on capital flows data. If they 
decided that Daimler Chrysler was a better way to get exposure to Germany than other German equities, 
they might have rebalanced their portfolios by selling other German stocks before or after the swap. Such 
sales would appear in the TIC data, so the offsetting swap should be added to the flows data as a 
purchase. Finally, they could have sold Daimler Chrysler after the swap, which would also appear as sales 
in the TIC data; again, the offsetting swap should be entered as a purchase. See Karolyi (2003) for a study 
of the Daimler Chrysler merger.  
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3.2 Financial Liberalization 
 
In this subsection we discuss the two variables that we use to capture international 
financial liberalization, a capital controls variable and a measure of cross-listings.
10 
 
3.2.1 Capital Controls 
     
  Many countries opened their financial markets to foreign investment to various degrees 
during our sample period.  The post-liberalization increase in inflows has been documented in 
Bekaert et al. (2002) and Edison and Warnock (2003).  However, the liberalization process is not 
a one-time event that is uniform across countries, as financial liberalizations vary greatly in their 
extent (full or incomplete) and evolution (one-time event or gradual).  To capture the potentially 
gradual nature of liberalizations, we use the first difference of the monthly measure of the 
intensity of capital controls developed in Edison and Warnock (2003).
11  The measure uses the 
fact that the International Finance Corporation’s Global Index (IFCG) is designed to capture the 
entire market and an individual stock’s weight in the Investable Index (IFCI) is determined 
mainly by legal restrictions.  Thus, the ratio of the market capitalizations behind the IFCI and 
IFCG is an indication of a country’s openness, and the following formula provides a measure of 
the intensity of foreign ownership restrictions, FOR: 
                                                       
10 On the link between domestic and international financial liberalization, see Levine (2001). 
11 Other measures of capital controls exist, but most are either annual or do not capture the intensity of 
controls.  See, for example, Alesina et al. (1994), Quinn (1997), Rodrik (1998), Montiel and Reinhart 
(1999), and the survey by Eichengreen (2001).  
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P   /   MC
P   /   MC   -   1   =   FOR IFCG
t    , i
IFCG
t    , i
IFCI
t    , i
IFCI
t    , i
t    , i   .                (6) 
 
Where, for country i, P denotes the IFC price indices and MC denotes the market capitalization 
of the particular index.  Deflating by the price indices eliminates relative market capitalization 
changes that might arise from asymmetric shocks to investable and global stocks.
12  The 
measure—which can vary from zero (completely open) to one (completely closed to foreign 
invesment)—is narrow in that it focuses on just one component of capital controls, but is 
appropriate for modeling equity flows. 
  Figure 2, which shows regional (market capitalization weighted) aggregates of the 
country-level measure of foreign ownership restrictions from 1989 through 2000, underscores 
regional differences in initial liberalizations and the evolution of the liberalization process.  Latin 
American economies liberalized much earlier and more completely than emerging Asia, where 
the liberalization process was more gradual and, in Malaysia, partially reversed in the late 1990s.  
In our empirical work, we use the first difference of FORi,t for each country i. 
 
3.2.2 Cross-Border Listings 
 
  The wave of cross-border listings of emerging market equities began in earnest in the 
1990s.  On U.S. exchanges, the equity can be directly listed, but the usual vehicle is a listing 
                                                       
12 If, for example, bank stocks are not available to foreigners, a pure banking sector shock would change 
the relative price of investable stocks and, hence, change relative market capitalizations.  
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through a Level II or Level III ADR.  The potential advantages of listing on a U.S. exchange 
include an enlarged investor base, increased visibility, a highly liquid secondary market, and the 
opportunity to raise new capital.
13  As noted in the introduction, from the investor’s perspective 
the cross-listing mitigates some of the uncertainties and costs involved with making direct 
purchases in foreign markets.  
  Our cross-border listing variable, CBLi,t, includes equities that are listed on U.S. 
exchanges either directly or as exchange-traded (or Levels II and III) ADRs, because these are 
the only foreign securities that are subject to the SEC’s stringent disclosure and reconciliation 
requirements.
14 CBLi,t is the share country i’s stock market that is newly listed on a U.S. 
exchange in month t.  For example, BAESA’s market capitalization was 2.3% of total 
Argentinian market capitalization when it listed on the NYSE in May 1993; in that month, CBL 
is 0.023 for Argentina.  Figure 3 depicts, for the month of a cross-listing, the market 
capitalization of the newly cross-listed firm as a percentage of regional market capitalization.  
The figure illustrates that Latin American cross-listings came in waves; they began in the early 
1990s, surged in 1993 and 1994, slowed with the Peso crisis of December 1994, and picked up 
by 1997 only to slow again with the Asian financial crisis.  In contrast, Asian cross-listings were 
much more muted and less frequent.  Finally, the effect of the Asian financial crisis is clear in 
                                                       
13 Studies of cross-listing behavior include Karolyi (1998), Pagano et al. (2002), Lins et al. (2005), and 
Claessens et al. (2002). 
14 In U.S. capital flows data, ADRs are treated just as any other foreign stock.  Transactions between a 
U.S. resident and a foreign resident are recorded, while those between two foreign or two domestic parties 
are not.  The depository bank, it should be noted, has only fiduciary responsibilities and does not take part 
in transactions; therefore, it does not create capital flows.  We do not consider other types of cross-
listings, such as private placements (through rule 144A) or over-the-counter (Level I and unsponsored) 
ADRs.  These do not benefit from U.S. investor protection regulations, but may have reduced transaction 
costs compared to securities that trade only in emerging markets, because the need to hire a global 
custodian in the local market is circumvented and liquidity may be better in New York; see Karolyi 
(2004) for evidence on these securities.  
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Figure 3b; no firm from emerging Asia listed on a U.S. exchange between the fall of 1997 and 
mid-1999. 
 
3.3  Proxies for Expected Risk and Return 
 
  In our empirical work we control for factors that have been identified in the capital flows 
literature.  Net equity inflows into emerging markets should be related to changes in expected 
risk and return.  No direct measures of expected risk and return are available, so we follow the 
literature and rely on proxies—the so-called global ￿push￿ and country-specific ￿pull￿ factors. 
  We include two country-specific factors that capture past and prospective returns.  As in 
Bekaert et al. (2002), we include lagged excess returns (excess of the foreign market over the 
U.S. market) to capture returns-chasing or positive feedback trading.  For expected returns, we 
use the dividend-price ratio, or dividend yield, which has been shown to have forecasting power 
for returns (Fama and French, 1988; Campbell and Shiller, 1988; Harvey, 1995).  If U.S. 
investors chase past (prospective) returns, an increase in past returns (dividend yields) should be 
associated with increased capital inflows.  
  For a risk measure we use the log of the International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) 
Composite Index, which Erb et al. (1996) show to have predicted power for expected returns.
15  
The ICRG rating is such that a higher number indicates less risk; controlling for expected 
returns, we expect higher ICRG risk ratings (that is, lower risk) to be associated with higher 
equity inflows. 
                                                       
15 Credit spreads on secondary market debt prices are another indicator of investment prospects, but are 
not available for a wide range of countries and, where available, start only in the early 1990s.  
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  The global factors that we consider are U.S. interest rates and the deviation from trend 
growth in U.S. industrial production.  As U.S. interest rates increase, so does U.S. investors’ 
risk-free rate of return; for constant relative returns, foreign investment becomes less attractive 
and lower cross-border net purchases are likely.  An increase in U.S. interest rates also increases 
borrowing costs for emerging markets, thereby reducing the expected profits of emerging market 
firms.  Stronger economic activity in the United States points toward higher future profits for 
U.S. firms and, hence, less equity investment abroad; counteracting this, however, may be a 
wealth effect that prompts U.S. investors to invest more abroad.  In our empirical work we utilize 
deviation from trend real-time industrial production as a measure of the strength of U.S. 
economic activity. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
  We estimate regional (fixed effects) panel regressions in which the dependent variable is 
(average) monthly equity inflows from month t to month t+k scaled by local market 
capitalization, where K=0 (short-horizon one-month flows to gauge the immediate impact of 
financial liberalizations) or K=11 (long-horizon 12-month flows).
16  In our regressions, variables 
proxying for expected risk and return—the push and pull factors—are dated at time t-1.  The 
liberalization variables, CBL and FOR, are dated at time t.  Summary statistics for all variables 
                                                       
16 Long-horizon regressions are often used when modeling stocks returns; see the discussion in Campbell 
et al. (1997).  Note that the long-horizon regressions impose an overlapping structure on the data that 
induces correlation in the errors.  To correct for this autocorrelation—which for 12-month ahead 
regressions cannot be of order greater than eleven—we use Newey and West (1987) standard errors that 
effectively widen traditional standard errors on persistent explanatory variables; see Valkonov (2003) for 
a recent critique.  
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are presented in Table 3.  Complete details on each variable are provided in the appendix.   
Specifically, we estimate the following equations for net U.S. purchases of stocks in country j 
scaled by country j’s market capitalization: 
 
) FOR   -   FOR (     +   CBL     +   DY     +   RET     +   RISK     +     =
1   +   k
Y  
1   -   t   j , t   j , 4 t   j , 3 1   -   t   j , 2 1   -   t   j , 1 1   -   t   j , 0
k   +   t   j ,
K




h b b k   +   t 1   -   t 6 1   -   t 5   +   USBOND     +   USIP     +      .                (7) 
 
The independent variable isY t   j ,  for short-horizon regressions (K=0) and 12   /   Y   k   +   t   j ,
11
=0 k ￿  for long-
horizon regressions (K=11).  The liberalization variables are: 
FOR   -   FOR 1   -   t t   change in foreign ownership restrictions from period t-1 to period t  
CBLt        new exchange-traded cross-border listing in period t. 
 
Control variables include 
RISK 1   -   t   change in the ICRG Composite Risk Index from period t-2 to period t-1 
RET 1   -   t   period t-1 returns relative to returns on S&P500 
Y   D 1   -   t    period t-1 dividend yield 
USIP 1   -   t    period t-1 deviation of real-time U.S. industrial production from a linear trend 
USBOND 1   -   t    period t-1 interest rate on a 10-year U.S. Treasury bond. 
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  Table 4 presents our panel results on the determinants of short-horizon equity flows.  The 
short-horizon results for our two liberalization variables are consistent with predictions of the 
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000) model.  Firm-level liberalizations (CBL), which we argue are 
narrow but deterministic, resulted in a highly significant increase in inflows in both regions.  The 
coefficients on CBL indicate that a new ADR program by a firm that is ten percent of the home 
market raises equity inflows that month by 0.746 percent of market capitalization in Latin 
America and 0.147 percent in Asia.  In contrast, reductions in capital controls, which are 
countrywide but uncertain, do not result in short-horizon inflows.  Indeed, the coefficient on 
FOR is positive for Latin America, suggesting that given the other control factors the infrequent 
reductions in Latin American capital controls in this period were associated with outflows.
17 
  Turning to the control variables, in both Latin America and emerging Asia, U.S. factors 
are very important, in line with previous findings (Chuhan et al. 1998; Montiel and Reinhart, 
1999; Calvo et al. 1993).  Both higher U.S. interest rates (which can lead to higher borrowing 
costs and reduced output in emerging markets) and above trend U.S. economic activity (which 
could signal greater prospective profits and, hence, higher expected returns for U.S. companies) 
result in significantly lower equity flows to emerging markets.  Consistent with Bohn and Tesar 
(1995) and Bekaert et al. (2002), there is partial evidence of returns chasing, as higher past 
returns result in greater inflows to Latin America.
18  The level of risk, as measured by the ICRG 
Composite Index, is not significant for either region. 
                                                       
17 The positive coefficient is driven by one country, Chile.  There is considerable uncertainty as to when 
Chile reduced capital controls.  IFC data would put the date at January 1996, whereas Edison and 
Warnock (2003) moved the liberalization to January 1992, the date of the change is legislation.  If we date 
the large change in Chile’s FOR at January 1996, the coefficient on FOR would be negative. 
18 However, see Thomas et al. (2006) for a more comprehensive study of returns-chasing behavior.  
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  Long-horizon regression results are presented in Table 5.  The impact of the liberalization 
variables varies across the regions.  A reduction in capital controls results in a significant 
increase in long-horizon equity flows to emerging Asia, but not to Latin America (where markets 
were mostly open throughout our sample).  Counter, at least at first glance, to the predictions 
from the theoretical model that deterministic liberalizations should result in immediate inflows 
that taper off, cross-listings in Latin America result in a significant increase in long-horizon 
inflows.  However, the coefficients for the cross-listing variable are much smaller than in the 
short-horizon regressions, suggesting that the portfolio rebalancing effect is important but short-
lived.  For example, a new Latin American ADR program by a firm that is ten percent of its 
home market and raises equity inflows in the month of the cross-listing by 0.746 percent of 
market capitalization (from Table 4), but only by 0.096 percent per month in the longer horizon 
(or 1.15 percent over the twelve-month period).  For Asia, CBL is insignificant in the long-
horizon regressions.  Thus, much of the cross-listing effect for Latin America, and all of it for 
emerging Asia, occurs in the month of the listing.
19  As in the short-horizon results, U.S. 
factors—especially U.S. economic growth—are important as well, but there is no evidence that 
pull factors affect long-horizon inflows. 
  Overall, the results in Tables 4 and 5 appear to provide evidence consistent with the 
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000) model.  The results suggest that countrywide liberalizations 
do not result in immediate inflows but—at least in emerging Asia—do spark longer-horizon 
                                                       
19 The cross-listing effect might be greater if the variable was based on the firm’s float instead of its 
market capitalization, but float data are not available back to 1989.  Also, abnormal returns prior to a 
cross-listing (Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Miller, 1999) suggest that some buying occurs before the cross-
listing.  
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inflows.
20  Deterministic firm-level liberalizations result in immediate inflows in both regions.  
In addition, U.S. factors play an important role. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
  Theory predicts that deterministic liberalizations should result in a sharp increase in 
inflows that then taper off, while inflows increase more gradually following uncertain 
liberalizations that require learning about their extent and permanence.  We think of a cross-
listing as a deterministic firm-level liberalization, and the more conventional countrywide 
financial liberalizations as being less certain.  In line with the theory, we find that the cross-
listing of an emerging market equity on a U.S. exchange results in sharp short-horizon inflows, 
whereas the reduction of capital controls results in inflows over longer horizons, at least in 
emerging Asia. 
  With country-level flows data, we can only speculate that the flows associated with a 
cross-listing are purchases of the cross-listed firm.  Another alternative is that investors become 
more aware of the emerging market at the time of the cross-listing and reconsider all of its 
equities.  However, evidence from Edison and Warnock (2004), which uses firm-level data on 
holdings (not flows), suggests that the listing effect might be limited to the cross-listed firm and 
not extend to other firms in the country.  Combined with the results for country-level capital 
flows in this paper, this suggests that the firm gets funding at the time of the cross-listing and the 
story ends: The emerging market does not enjoy widespread foreign buying, nor does foreign 
                                                       
20 We also ran vector autoregressions (not shown).  Evidence from the VARs are broadly consistent with 
our panel results.  Given that it is unclear how to order the Cholesky decomposition, a careful VAR 
analysis would require 5040 (7 factorial) sets of 7 graphs, so we do not present these graphs.  
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investment in the cross-listed firm subsequently increase.  Future research, perhaps using daily 
security-level cross-border flow data, might be able to provide further evidence on this issue. 
 
Appendix: Description of Data and Sources 
 
The equity flows data we analyze are monthly portfolio equity flows from the United 
States to emerging market countries, compiled by the U.S. Treasury International Capital (TIC) 
Reporting System.  U.S. net purchases of securities in a given country are defined as gross 
purchases of foreign securities by U.S. residents from residents of that country (column 12 in the 
standard TIC presentation) minus gross sales of foreign securities from U.S. residents to 
residents of that country (column 6).  The data are available at www.treas.gov/tic/.  Our CBL 
variable, formed using data on the worldwide market capitalization of foreign firms listed on 
U.S. exchanges, is taken mainly from the S&P’s Emerging Markets Data Base.  We use firm-
level market capitalization data as of the month the firm cross-listed, except when the firm does 
not appear in the EMDB as of the listing month.  In those instances, the market capitalization 
used is that of the first month EMDB data became available for that firm.  In the event that the 
firm was never added to the EMDB, we turned next to Datastream and then, for a small number 
of firms, to the NYSE.  Country-level market capitalization data are from the EMDB and 
coincide with the month of the firm-level data. Because international securities transactions are 
reported to the TIC system using settlement date accounting, we move to the following month 
any listing that occurs in the last two business days of a month.  Our measure of the change in 
foreign ownership restrictions uses monthly price and market capitalization data from the 
IFC/S&P Investable and Global Indexes.  See Edison and Warnock (2003) for a complete  
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discussion.  Equity returns are from Morgan Stanley MSCI indexes (www.mscidata.com).  
Dividend yields, from the IFC, are a trailing 12-month moving average of dividends divided by 
the current price level.  The risk measure is the International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) 
Composite Index; see Erb et al. (1996).  Real-time U.S. industrial production data are 
available at www.phil.frb.org/econ/forecast/reaindex.html; see Croushore and Stark (2001) for a 
complete description.  The U.S. interest rate on a medium-term U.S. bond is from the IMF’s IFS 
data set.  Countries included in panel regressions are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico (for 
Latin America) and Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand (for Emerging Asia). 
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Figure 2. Foreign Ownership Restrictions 
(a) Latin America
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a Data are from various issues of the World Bank’s Global Development Finance publication.  The regions in this table correspond with World 
Bank conventions and are much broader than those used in other tables and figures in this paper. 
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Table 2:  Net US purchases of emerging market stocks
a  
(annual averages, in millions of US $) 
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a  Surces: U.S. Department of Treasury, Treasury International Capital Reporting System; World Bank, 
Global Development Finance; Securities Data Corporation.  
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Table 3. Summary Statistics
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Panel B. Emerging Asia 
 
 





























































































































































































































































































a Data are for the Latin American and Emerging Asian panels. Y is monthly net U.S. purchases of the country i’s equities normalized by country 
i’s  market capitalization. RISK is the log first difference of the ICRG Composite Risk. DY is the dividend yield. RET is the difference in rates of 
return on equities in country i and the US. CBL is the relative size (firm market capitalization as a share of home country market capitalization) of 
a cross-listing on a US exchange. USIP is the deviation of real-time US industrial production from a time trend. USBOND is the rate on a 
medium-term US bond.  FOR is the first difference of the intensity of foreign ownership restrictions.  Further details on the variables are provided 
in the appendix.  
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  Dependent variable is monthly net U.S. purchases of the country i’s equities normalized by country i’s  market capitalization.  
Samples, which start in January 1989 (Latin America) and November 1990 (Emerging Asia), are through 1999.  All independent 
variables are at time t-1, except CBL and FOR, which are dated at time t.  See Table 3 for a description of the independent 

















































































a  Dependent variable is average 12-month  net US purchases of country i’s equities normalized by country i’s market 
capitalization.  Samples, which start in January 1989 (Latin America) and November 1990 (Emerging Asia), are through 1999.  
All independent variables are at time t-1, except CBL and FOR, which are dated at time t.  See Table 3 for a description of the 
independent variables.  Constants are included but not reported.  P-values computed using Newey and West (1987) standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
***, 
**, and 
* indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. 